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Abstract: In recent years, donor-advised funds (DAFs), historically a relative-
ly minor part of American philanthropy, have taken on an outsized im-
portance. The dramatic growth of donor-advised funds has been driven not 
only by the inherent attractiveness of DAFs, but also by the profit margins of 
the financial services industry and the donors’ financial advisors. As more and 
more money rushes into DAFs – as of 2013, roughly 7% of all charitable gifts 
from individuals – the operating nonprofits that supposedly are the beneficiar-
ies of donor-advised funds are losing out. At a time of higher demand for ser-
vices and reduced funding, nonprofits are looking to individual donors for fi-
nancial support, but increasingly donors are diverting their gifts into DAFs. 
This might be acceptable if DAFs were inspiring increased charitable giving, 
but there is little evidence to support that claim. And, because there is no 
mandated spend-down requirement, far more money is flowing into donor-
advised funds than is flowing out into the charitable community. Wise public 
policy demands that Congress act to mandate an account-by-account spend-
down of donor-advised funds within 15 to 20 years of the date of donation, 
and to prohibit private foundations from meeting their 5% distribution re-
quirement through grants to DAFs. 
Philanthropy is no longer primarily defined by the donation of money 
to charity. Though the majority of American donors continue to give contri-
butions directly to schools, soup kitchens, Boys and Girls Clubs, and other 
nonprofits, increasingly donors prefer to squirrel charitable funds into phil-
anthropic entities that they control. Only later, if at all, does the money fi-
nally reach operating nonprofits providing actual services. While the tradi-
tional vehicle for this kind of deferred giving, the private foundation, con-
tinues to receive significant new donations every year, the increasingly 
popular choice in recent years has been the donor-advised fund. Donor-
advised funds (DAFs) are naturally attractive to donors, offering tremen-
dous – and, I would argue, too much – flexibility. But the success of donor-
advised funds is not simply based on their inherent qualities. The driving 
force behind the rise of donor-advised funds is the financial services indus-
try, which has found a simple and marketable way to profit from charitable 
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giving. Meanwhile, nonprofit organizations that provide actual services are 
losing out. Money that otherwise would have gone to the nonprofits as di-
rect donations is now being diverted into donor-advised funds. 
DAFs have experienced astronomical growth. Giving to donor-advised 
funds in 2013 was more than two-and-a-half times the level of only four 
years before,1 and contributions to donor-advised funds exceeded 7% of 
total giving from individuals.2 Advocates for donor-advised funds see this 
surging popularity as an unalloyed good, promoting charitable giving 
among those who otherwise would not be donors, and making philanthropy 
simpler and more flexible for a wider swath of people. They also see donor-
advised funds as promoting the democratization of philanthropy, allowing 
upper-middle-class donors who could never afford to establish private 
foundations to create philanthropic vehicles of their own. 
Others of us are vastly more skeptical. Donor-advised funds have 
grown like kudzu, but there’s no evidence that DAFs are increasing overall 
charitable giving. In fact, there are indications that money that otherwise 
would have gone to operating charities – the organizations that are doing 
the actual work of the sector – is now streaming into donor-advised funds. 
Moreover, it now seems clear that the engine driving the growth in donor-
advised funds has not been the dawning of a new kind of charitable im-
pulse, but the profit margins of the financial services industry. Over the past 
twenty-five years, Wall Street has established itself as an invasive species in 
the charitable ecosystem, fundamentally altering incentives, motivations, 
rewards, and relationships. Charitable giving has changed, and not for the 
better. 
THE EVOLUTION OF DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS 
Donor-advised funds are not new. The first were created in the 1930s 
at the New York Community Trust, and other community foundations fol-
lowed suit. Before that time, community foundations like the New York 
Community Trust had relied primarily upon charitable bequests to build 
their assets. The foundations’ leaders saw donor-advised funds as a way to 
engage living donors and promote lifetime giving. 
The notion behind DAFs was both attractive and a bit self-
contradictory, presaging the ambiguity that hovers around donor-advised 
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funds today. A gift to a community foundation establishing a donor-advised 
fund was considered an outright donation, with control of the funds passing 
fully to the community foundation and its board. This structure provided the 
donor with an immediate full charitable deduction. Yet there was an under-
standing that donors retained an ongoing privilege to direct where and 
when those funds would be eventually distributed. The architects of DAFs 
were careful not to call these entities “donor-directed funds,” as that would 
have indicated a legal right to exert control (as opposed to an understanding 
of the parties), thereby negating the charitable deduction. And yet the do-
nor’s explicit influence in the decision-making was baked into the structure. 
From the beginning, there has been what some have called a “wink-and-
nod” flavor to how donor-advised funds have been treated in tax law: the 
contribution to a donor-advised fund is an outright gift without any strings 
so far as the charitable tax deduction is concerned, but the donor retains 
significant influence over the distribution of the grants from the fund. 
Over the years this ambiguity didn’t bother many people, or even gain 
much attention, perhaps because not all that much money was involved. For 
decades, donor-advised funds resided mostly in the relatively obscure con-
fines of community foundations, with several national religious federations 
joining in to create donor-advised programs of their own. That said, the 
number of community foundations mushroomed in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s, and donor-advised funds served as a major driver of that growth. 
The new community foundations did not have the large asset base of the 
older community foundations, and they needed to attract donors with an 
irresistible kind of offering. Donor-advised funds filled the bill. Donor-
advised funds became the flagship product for community foundations new 
and old – a have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too way for donors to get a full chari-
table deduction at an advantageous moment, while retaining effective con-
trol of the assets after the gift was complete. 
In the early years, there typically was a genuine sharing of responsibil-
ity for donor-advised fund grantmaking. Community foundations and their 
donors would talk with one another about grantmaking from the funds, 
nudging each other toward the best possible use of the grants. Community 
foundations remain in touch with their donors today, of course, but by many 
accounts there was a greater sense of shared decision-making before the 
1990s, and the grant decisions were not nearly so exclusively the preroga-
tive of the donor. A staff member of the New York Community Trust told 
me that in the 1980s there was discussion on the staff level about whether 
they even needed to send donors a year-end report on their donor-advised 
funds. The sense then, far more than now, was that donor advice was just 
that. The funds belonged to the donor-advised fund sponsor – that is, the 
community foundation. 
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But a sea change in the world of donor-advised funds came in 1991, 
when the IRS granted 501(c)(3) public charity tax status to the Fidelity 
Charitable Gift Fund. Donor-advised funds were no longer the exclusive 
province of community foundations and religious federations. Now donor-
advised funds were integrated with a mutual fund powerhouse, complete 
with Wall Street’s marketing power, technological expertise, and efficien-
cies of scale. The volume of money moving into donor-advised funds grew 
vastly larger, and the nature of donor-advised fund marketing and opera-
tions quickly transitioned to a model that bore little resemblance to the 
world before 1991. 
The effect of Wall Street’s arrival in the donor-advised fund industry 
was dramatic. Donor-advised funds became a commodity, compared on the 
basis of cost and efficiency, with little regard for the niceties of collabora-
tion and consultation between sponsor and donor that characterized their 
early community foundation years. Donor-advised funds were reduced in 
large part to transactional entities. One click and the donor could establish a 
fund. A second click and the donor could choose the investment vehicles. 
The donor clicked a third time to make a grant. Fidelity did not ever pretend 
to provide in-depth advice to its donors on their grantmaking, nor did it 
make an effort to provide any sort of check on donors’ decision-making, 
other than to ensure that the beneficiary was in fact a public charity. Fidelity 
(and, soon, Schwab and Vanguard and dozens of other commercial funds) 
left the grantmaking to the donors and kept the costs competitive. The orig-
inal rationale for donor-advised funds – that this was a mission-driven part-
nership between the donor and the sponsoring organization, with the spon-
soring organization providing philanthropic guidance and expertise – fell by 
the wayside in the rush for volume, efficiency, and market share. 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND THE GROWTH OF DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS 
The key to understanding the growth of donor-advised funds is to rec-
ognize the incentives donor-advised funds provide for the financial services 
industry. Compensation for financial advisors is typically based on the size 
of the assets they have under management: the larger their clients’ portfoli-
os, the higher the financial advisors’ income. This gives financial advisors 
an incentive to keep their clients’ money invested – and, of course, to man-
age those investments so that the portfolios grow. This also means that the 
clients’ transfer of assets out of their accounts – to charities or any other 
purpose – results in a loss of income to the financial advisor. 
A generation ago, charitable giving from a brokerage account was rela-
tively simple. When a client decided to transfer significant assets as a gift to 
charity, the financial advisor might have grimaced inwardly. That’s because 
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assets would be flowing out of the client’s portfolio, and the financial advi-
sor’s income would drop accordingly. That said, the financial advisor would 
have carried out his duty to the client and transferred the assets – usually in 
the form of appreciated stock – to the designated charity. The financial ad-
visor really had no choice. 
Today, the financial advisor has an alternative to offer the clients: the 
transfer of assets to a commercial donor-advised fund. The financial advisor 
typically will explain how the client can get a full charitable deduction for a 
gift to a donor-advised fund, as well as avoid all capital gains taxes on ap-
preciated assets. The financial advisor will cite the flexibility of the DAF: 
the client can distribute grants now, or later, or build the fund up to serve as 
a philanthropic vehicle for future years or even for the next generation’s 
philanthropic giving. What the financial advisor likely does not stress in 
that conversation (or, I imagine, even mention) is how the financial advisor 
will continue to draw management fees from the donor-advised fund, much 
as if the donor had never given the funds away at all. In fact, the longer the 
fund sits and grows, rather than being distributed to charity, the more the 
financial advisor will earn. 
And as for the financial services firm itself? Though the donor-advised 
fund sponsoring organization is structured as an independent 501(c)(3) pub-
lic charity, the donor-advised fund assets are typically invested in the affili-
ated for-profit corporation’s mutual funds. This obviously is a source of 
profit for the corporation. Fidelity Charitable, for example, had more than 
$13 billion in assets at the close of its June 2013 tax year, an amount that 
clearly provides considerable income for Fidelity Investments.3 Moreover, 
the charitable arm shares the name of the corporation (“Fidelity Charitable” 
or “The UBS Donor-Advised Fund”), thereby providing cross-marketing 
opportunities for the corporation and lending the firm a patina of charitable 
benevolence. 
The growth in giving to donor-advised funds has been stunning. In the 
Chronicle of Philanthropy’s 2014 “Philanthropy 400,” its annual listing of 
the American nonprofits that raised the most money in the past year, three 
of the top ten organizations were commercial donor-advised funds (Fidelity 
Charitable at number two, Schwab Charitable at number four, and Vanguard 
Charitable at number ten), while a fourth donor-advised fund sponsor (the 
Silicon Valley Community Foundation) landed at number eight. (It’s worth 
noting that none of these organizations existed in its current form 25 years 
before.) To provide some perspective, Stanford (number 14), Harvard (20), 
and Yale (39), all undeniable fundraising powerhouses, lagged far behind. 
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Overall giving to donor-advised funds in 2013 totaled $17.2 billion: 252% 
of the level of only four years before.4 
Commercial donor-advised fund websites feature prominent marketing 
to financial advisors, with the persistent theme that it’s very much in the 
self-interest of the financial advisors to encourage their clients to create do-
nor-advised funds. As a video aimed at financial advisors on the Fidelity 
Charitable website puts it, “Charitable conversations help you grow your 
practice” and allow advisors “to reach new clients, including the next gen-
eration.” The video emphasizes that financial advisors will be paid a fee for 
the investment management of their clients’ donor-advised funds at Fidelity, 
and the voiceover reassures the financial advisors that when their clients 
create funds at Fidelity Charitable, they can report them as assets under 
management.5 
Fidelity, Schwab, and Vanguard Charitable market both to the general 
public and to financial advisors at various firms. Though they are the largest 
and best known of the commercial gift funds, they are hardly alone. Dozens 
of financial services companies have their own in-house donor-advised 
funds and do not need to go out of their way to market to their own finan-
cial advisors. These financial advisors know full well that their clients’ do-
nor-advised funds count as assets under management. That is, the financial 
advisors understand that they will continue to draw income from their cli-
ents’ donor-advised funds. 
There is even one donor-advised fund entity, the American Endowment 
Foundation (number 152 on the 2014 Philanthropy 400), whose business 
model allows financial advisors to invest their clients’ assets in financial 
instruments at nearly any firm. The founder of the American Endowment 
Foundation, Philip Tobin, had earlier served as the CFO of the Cleveland 
Foundation, the country’s oldest community foundation. He saw that finan-
cial advisors were loath to encourage clients to set up funds at the Cleve-
land Foundation because they had no personal financial incentive to do so. 
Tobin realized that winning over financial advisors was the key to receiving 
DAF donations, and so he created an entity that is as user-friendly as possi-
ble for the financial services industry. Financial advisors can invest their 
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clients’ American Endowment Foundation donor-advised fund assets in 
nearly any financial instrument and receive management fees.6 
Community foundations, which traditionally had not offered an incen-
tive to financial advisors, have been at a competitive disadvantage, and they 
are now hustling to catch up. It is not as though giving to donor-advised 
funds at community foundations has been dormant, but community founda-
tions have not seen growth as dramatic as at the commercial gift funds like 
Fidelity and Schwab.7 In an effort to fight fire with fire, a growing number 
of community foundations are now cutting deals with financial advisors, 
allowing them to manage the assets of community foundation donor-
advised funds created by their clients. This outreach illustrates how the tra-
ditional relationship between donor and nonprofit has changed. There is 
now a third party deeply involved in the charitable process: the donor’s fi-
nancial advisor, whose financial interest is at odds with that of the charita-
ble sector as a whole. 
What about operating nonprofits, the organizations that provide chari-
table services? They have largely been left behind. Yes, nonprofits receive 
grants from donor-advised funds, but year after year much more money has 
been going into donor-advised funds than has been going out in grants. (In 
2013 the overall surplus was over $7 billion.) Moreover, donor-advised 
funds now serve as a middleman between nonprofits and many of the do-
nors, complicating that critical relationship. Nonprofits also face logistical 
challenges, in that there are limitations on the purposes to which donor-
advised fund grants can be used.8 But, though nonprofit executives may 
complain vociferously in private, they say little or nothing publicly about 
donor-advised funds. This is not surprising: nonprofits are not in a position 
where they can risk offending their donors and funders. 
No moment so captures the growing dominance in the charitable world 
of Wall Street values and incentives as the decision in 2014 by the Associa-
tion of Fundraising Professionals (AFP), the preeminent national associa-
tion of the nonprofit development field, to give the organization’s highest 
honor to the President and CEO of the National Philanthropic Trust (NPT). 
The National Philanthropic Trust is a DAF sponsor that also functions as a 
back shop for commercial donor-advised funds at various financial firms. 
One client of NPT, for example, is the large financial services firm UBS. If 
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a client at UBS transfers assets to what is marketed as the UBS Donor-
Advised Fund, in fact the money goes to the National Philanthropic Trust, 
which then manages the grantmaking and the reporting on behalf of UBS. 
As explained above, the driver for the growth of the UBS donor-advised 
fund and other commercial gift funds is the management fee paid to the cli-
ents’ financial advisors. It is therefore not a stretch to say that the success of 
the National Philanthropic Trust (which ranked 26th in the most recent Phi-
lanthropy 400 survey) is based on financial incentives paid to the donors’ 
financial advisors. 
And this is precisely what made AFP’s award to the National Philan-
thropic Trust CEO so telling – and so inappropriate. The Association of 
Fundraising Professionals’ Code of Ethical Standards states that no solicitor 
of charitable gifts should receive a commission or be paid as a percentage 
of the gift. Rather, AFP asserts, all development staff should be salaried, to 
avoid conflicts of interest and the temptation to encourage gifts that would 
not be in the best interest of the donors and the nonprofits. And yet AFP 
gave its highest award to the CEO of an enterprise whose business model is 
based on precisely the kind of commissions that AFP itself deems unethical. 
If commercial donor-advised fund sponsors like NPT are indeed charitable 
institutions (as their application to the IRS assures us they are), that makes 
the financial advisors who promote gifts to the commercial gift funds chari-
table solicitors. And the subsequent management fee they receive (and con-
tinue to receive) is a very thinly veiled form of commission. 
It’s now clear the decision by the IRS in 1991 to offer public charity 
status to the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund was an epochal moment, having a 
similar effect on the charitable world that the Supreme Court’s Citizens 
United ruling had on politics. The 1991 Fidelity decision opened the flood-
gates to a rush of money associated with less-than-purely-charitable motiva-
tions. American philanthropy has changed in such a fundamental and sud-
den manner that even the country’s major association of professional fund-
raisers is blinded to the ethical challenges presented by the rise of donor-
advised funds. 
MORE MONEY OR WAREHOUSED MONEY? 
Advocates for donor-advised funds assert that DAFs are encouraging 
people who otherwise would not be so inclined to make charitable gifts, 
thereby increasing overall charitable giving. But the evidence for this is un-
convincing. 
With the tremendous growth in giving to donor-advised funds in recent 
years, we would expect to have seen a rise in the overall level of charitable 
giving. Certainly, charitable giving has been growing since the depths of the 
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Great Recession. But, as a percentage of disposable personal income, giving 
has remained flat. In fact, as Giving USA™ reports (Graph 1), charitable 
giving as a percentage of disposable personal income has remained virtually 
unchanged for the last 40 years, hovering at or around 2%. So the overall 
charitable giving as a percentage of disposable income has been flat, while 
the percentage of that giving that has been directed into donor-advised 
funds has been rising tremendously. This indicates that the portion of chari-
table giving going directly to operating charities has dropped. Money that 
might have gone to a community program or food pantry instead is going 
into donor-advised funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advocates for donor-advised funds say that this argument misses the 
point. After all, they assert, money given to donor-advised funds eventually 
finds its way to operating charities. But does it? Those who seek reform of 
the rules governing donor-advised funds cite the absence of a required pay-
out as the great flaw in this presumption. The IRS treats the donation of 
money to donor-advised funds as the charitable event, an outright gift to a 
501(c)(3) public charity. There is no expectation that any particular fund 
then needs to distribute its assets in any year, or at all. The money in, say, 
the Espinoza Family Donor-Advised Fund can sit invested in perpetuity. In 
some cases the DAF sponsor (the community foundation or commercial gift 
fund) may contact the donor-advisors and suggest or even require that they 
make a distribution, but there is no federal requirement that a particular 
fund make charitable grants. Moreover, it would be naive to ignore the fact 
that, from a business standpoint, it’s in the interest of the DAF sponsor for 
the donor-advised fund assets to remain invested. After all, the larger the 
donor-advised fund, and the longer it is invested, the more the DAF sponsor 
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receives in fees – and, in the case of the commercial gift funds, the more the 
individual donors’ financial advisors and the associated financial services 
firms earn in management fees. 
Advocates for donor-advised funds take offense at the suggestion that 
the money is being warehoused, and they point to the high annual payout 
rate, which by their calculation hovers around 21%.9 They note that this 
ratio is significantly higher than the 5% required (or the nearly 6% actually 
distributed) from private foundations. 
Those who seek reform of the rules governing donor-advised funds 
counter that the comparison to private foundations is irrelevant. Donor-
advised funds bring much greater tax benefits than private foundations, par-
ticularly in providing a market rate charitable tax deduction for appreciated 
privately-held stock, real estate, and other illiquid assets. (For gifts to pri-
vate foundations, the charitable contribution for appreciated assets other 
than publicly traded stock is figured at the lower cost basis.) This amounts 
to an enormous subsidy by the federal government, and donor-advised 
funds consequently need to be held to a high standard in terms of their char-
itable impact. More to the point, gifts to donor-advised funds receive the 
same charitable deduction as contributions to operating nonprofits that are 
providing direct services. Shouldn’t there be an expectation that a gift treat-
ed identically to a donation to an operating nonprofit actually goes out the 
door at some point to create some mission impact? 
Second, averages can be deceiving. This was explained well in a 2012 
study on donor-advised funds by the Congressional Research Service. The 
study pointed out that if there are ten identical donor-advised funds, and 
two put out 80% of their assets in a given year, and the other eight do not 
                                                                                                                           
 9 In its 2014 Donor-Advised Fund Report, the National Philanthropic Trust (NPT) adjusted its 
formula for measuring the distribution rate from donor-advised funds. The distribution rate is 
essentially a ratio of funds granted out divided by assets under management. Before 2014, NPT 
used the year-end assets of all donor-advised funds as the denominator in figuring out the distribu-
tion ratio. For example, for calculating the spending rate in 2012, NPT took all the DAF grants in 
2012 and divided that number by the total assets held by DAFs on December 31, 2012. This 
changed the next year. In calculating the distributions in 2013 (for its 2014 report), NPT began 
using the start-of-year assets as the denominator. That is, NPT divided the 2013 distributions by 
the December 31, 2012 asset total. This change served to increase the reported distribution per-
centage by 500 basis points or so, from about 16% to about 21%. (NPT also went back and adjust-
ed the formula for earlier years, so the distribution percentages before 2013 bumped up retroac-
tively in a similar way.) NPT felt the original formula somewhat underestimated distributions, 
because donors could make large contributions to their DAF accounts at year-end that would have 
gone into the asset total, but that would not have had time to be distributed. NPT has a point. That 
said, the new formula somewhat overestimates distributions. By their new calculations, when a 
dollar is donated and distributed in the year in question, it would result in only the distribution 
being counted, and not the assets (because the money would be gone by December 31). A fair 
estimation of the true distribution rate is probably somewhere between the results arrived at by 
these two methods – that is, somewhere between 16% and 21%. 
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distribute a single penny, then on average they have distributed 16%.10 At 
first glance the 16% payout is impressive, but it’s striking that this average 
distribution level could be reached when eight out of ten donors in this sce-
nario did not distribute any grants at all. 
Which leads to a third point: it is important to differentiate between 
charitable distributions from individual donor-advised fund accounts and 
the overall distributions from the donor-advised fund sponsors. In the wake 
of criticism about insufficient charitable distributions, DAF sponsors have 
taken to focusing their public relations on the charitable impact of their 
funds. They talk about their high overall distribution rates and cite the dol-
lars they have distributed. (“Grants from Fidelity Charitable Donor-advised 
Funds Increased 33 Percent to Nearly $1.5 Billion, in First Half of 2015,” 
read the headline from a recent press release, which is typical of the indus-
try.11) In fact, Fidelity Charitable has gone so far as to create a contrived 
formula of its own for reporting – and exaggerating – its distributions, a 
calculation that divides that year’s charitable distributions by the artificially 
low five-year trailing average of its total assets.12 
Yet the same donor-advised fund leaders who speak about the primacy 
of charitable distributions are utterly resistant to the idea of requiring any 
sort of distributions on a per-account basis. Fidelity Charitable volunteered 
to hold itself to an overall minimum distribution of five percent annually 
(based, again, in their unique formulation, on fiscal year distributions divid-
ed by a five-year trailing average), a payout hurdle that is so much below its 
actual annual distribution that it seems designed purely for show. Mean-
while, Fidelity Charitable requires only that an individual account holder 
recommend total distributions of at least $250 over a seven-year period – 
hardly an intensive requirement, and such a tiny fraction of the average do-
nor-advised fund that it barely registers as a percentage of the assets.13 
Why does it matter how much each individual account holder distrib-
utes to charity? Because that person has received a full charitable tax deduc-
tion for the gift to the donor-advised fund, the same as a contribution to a 
soup kitchen that feeds the hungry. Common sense and smart public policy 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Molly F. Sherlock and Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R42595, “An Analysis of 
Charitable Giving and Donor Advised Funds” at 9 (June 11, 2012). 
 11 Press Release, Fidelity Charitable, July 15, 2015, http://fidelitycharitable.org/about-us/
news/07-15-2015.shtml. 
 12 Alan M. Cantor, “A Closer Look at a Donor-Advised Fund’s Questionable Payout Num-
bers,” Inside Philanthropy, July 20, 2015. http://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2015/7/20/a-
closer-look-at-a-donor-advised-funds-questionable-payout-n.html, accessed August 8, 2015. 
 13 “Fidelity Charitable Policy Guidelines: Program Circular,” at 18-19. http://www.fidelity
charitable.org/docs/Giving-Account-Policy-Guidelines.pdf, last updated Jul. 2013. 
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demand that charitable contributions actually go to a charitable purpose – if 
not immediately, then before too long. 
Those supporting the status quo will respond by saying that the focus 
on per-account distributions misses the point. They assert that inactive 
funds are the exception, not the rule, and they point to the seemingly high 
overall annual distribution rate. But because of the lack of transparency sur-
rounding donor-advised funds, the public has no way of knowing how many 
donor-advised funds are actually inactive or what the median – as opposed 
to the average – distribution rate might be. While the records of private 
foundations are open to the public, with each and every grant and honorari-
um revealed on their tax returns, donor-advised funds are considered part of 
a public charity – the DAF sponsor. Consequently, donor-advised fund 
sponsors do not have to share any grant information. That information re-
mains private. Once money goes into a DAF, there’s no way for anyone on 
the outside to be sure of the distribution of the assets. 
At this point, the debate about donor-advised funds follows a predicta-
ble path. Critics accuse donor-advised funds of warehousing money and say 
that many funds are inactive. Donor-advised fund sponsors say that that’s 
not the case – that very few funds are inactive. Critics respond by asking the 
DAF sponsors to share their account-by-account records so they can exam-
ine the evidence. The donor-advised fund sponsors respond by saying that 
they don’t have to share that information, that they need to give their donors 
privacy, and that the public can and should trust them that the money is go-
ing out the door. And so the argument cycles around once more. 
MANIPULATIONS OF THE SYSTEM 
Nearly all donors who create DAFs do so with good intentions. 
Though I may take issue with the rules under which donor-advised funds 
operate, I acknowledge that most donors are driven by charitable intent. But 
some donors have taken advantage of the murkiness and lack of transparen-
cy surrounding donor-advised funds for questionable ends. 
This is certainly the case with private foundations using DAFs to meet 
their required payouts. Private foundations must distribute an amount equal 
to five percent of their assets annually, and all of their grants must be listed 
in the foundations’ 990-PF tax returns. One ploy used by private founda-
tions, either to obfuscate the identity of their grant recipients, to keep the 
funds in reserve for future grants, or as a safety valve in case they are strug-
gling to meet the five-percent minimum distribution mark, is to make grants 
to donor-advised funds controlled by the foundations’ trustees. Because the 
DAF sponsor meets the technical definition of a public charity, the founda-
tion can include that grant to help it meet the five-percent distribution re-
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quirement. But though this tactic meets the letter of the law, it very much 
violates the spirit. The funds have not gone to an actual charitable purpose, 
but simply moved from one invested charitable fund to another. And though 
the foundation has given up legal control over the funds, it retains de facto 
control. In the process, transparency has been lost. Once the money has 
passed into the donor-advised fund, the public cannot ascertain the end-use 
charitable beneficiaries, or know if the funds had been distributed to operat-
ing charities at all. The trail runs cold. 
In some cases, a grant to a donor-advised fund is a last-minute solution 
to meeting the five-percent distribution requirement. At other times a pri-
vate foundation’s use of donor-advised funds is a way of covering its trail 
and avoiding public scrutiny. One donor-advised fund sponsor that has been 
implicated in this sort of “identity laundering” has been the Virginia-based 
Donors Trust, which has passed over $400 million to conservative causes 
since 1999.14 
To understand how Donors Trust operates, it’s important to appreciate 
the advantages of having public charity tax status. A private foundation is 
required to report fully in its 990-PF tax returns each and every grant, in-
vestment, and honorarium. A public charity, by contrast, can offer its donors 
anonymity. Donor-advised fund sponsors, including Donors Trust, are con-
sidered public charities, and they consequently do not have to list their 
grants or say which DAF funded them. A report from the Center for Public 
Integrity detailed how some donors have taken advantage of the public 
charity status of Donors Trust to hide their foundation grants from disclo-
sure. Prominent donors, including Charles Koch, have made large contribu-
tions to Donors Trust, often from their private foundations. Donors Trust 
then passed the money through as anonymous grants to controversial organ-
izations such as the Heartland Institute, which works to debunk climate 
change research, and the American Legislative Exchange Council, which 
writes and facilitates conservative legislation at the state level. 
There are two benefits to the donors and the nonprofits in this transac-
tion. First, the donors are not directly connected to these organizations, as 
the grants are anonymous. This allows both the donors and the nonprofits to 
disavow any connection. Second, those grants are considered as coming 
from the public (because Donors Trust is a public charity with more than 
200 donors), and that helps the nonprofit beneficiaries meet the “public 
support test.” (The public support test is an arcane but critically important 
                                                                                                                           
 14 U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (Dem-RI) referred to this process as “an identity-
laundering scheme.” See Sandy Bauers, “Climate-change Skepticism’s Funding Sources are Ob-
scure” Philly.com, February 12, 2014, http://articles.philly.com/2014-02-12/news/47238883_1_
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144 The Rise of Donor-Advised Funds: Should Congress Respond?  
measure to make sure that a particular public charity is not relying on only 
one or two major donors. An organization must prove that it has widespread 
contributions and earnings from many sources – “public support” – in order 
to keep its public charity tax status.) The use of donor-advised funds allows 
an organization to meet the public support test even in cases where nearly 
all of its income derives from a single individual. In other words, if one par-
ticular donor pays for 90% of an organization’s operating expenses directly, 
the organization will be a private foundation, with all of the resulting dis-
closure requirements and less favorable tax treatment. However, if the same 
donor passes his or her contribution through a donor-advised fund, the re-
cipient organization can now meet the definition of a public charity, with all 
the benefits that brings.15 
Again, this sort of charitable shell game is likely the exception, not the 
rule. Most donors set up and utilize their donor-advised funds with honora-
ble intentions. But the lack of transparency and regulation surrounding do-
nor-advised funds serve as an invitation to manipulative behaviors by those 
who are so inclined. 
SHOULD CONGRESS RESPOND? IF SO, HOW? 
I do not advocate shutting down donor-advised funds. Donor-advised 
funds perform an important role in American philanthropy. Generally 
speaking, DAFs are more efficient than private foundations, and they are a 
user-friendly tool for donors, facilitating tax-efficient charitable giving. Do-
nor-advised funds are particularly useful for harvesting capital gains at the 
time of a “liquidity event” such as the sale of a privately-held business. 
Should DAFs remain a part of the philanthropic landscape? Absolutely. Do 
they need to be reviewed and reformed in order to reduce abuses and in-
crease their charitable impact? Again, absolutely. The rules governing do-
nor-advised funds need to catch up with the realities of how they are cur-
rently being used. 
One simple reform would be to prohibit private foundations from mak-
ing grants to donor-advised funds. Private foundation grants to DAFs by-
pass the intent of the five-percent distribution rule, and granting money to 
donor-advised funds obfuscates the public’s right to know where the private 
foundations’ money is going. Singling out donor-advised funds as ineligible 
grantees makes public policy sense. 
The more essential adjustment to the rules governing donor-advised 
funds would be to require the distribution of their assets to operating chari-
                                                                                                                           
 15 Paul Abowd, “Donors use charity to push free-market policies in states,” The Center For 
Public Integrity, February 14, 2013. See also Andy Kroll, “Exposed: The Dark-Money ATM of 
the Conservative Movement,” Mother Jones, Feb. 5, 2013. 
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ties within a set period of years. A per-account spend-down requirement 
would help justify the charitable deduction by ensuring that money donated 
to donor-advised funds would actually find its way to charity, with the char-
itable impact happening before too much time has passed. 
The idea of a required spend-down was first proposed in a 2011 New 
York Times op-ed by Boston College Law Professor Ray D. Madoff.16 
Madoff called for a seven-year spend-down for donor-advised funds. This 
concept received heightened attention in 2014 when Congressman Dave 
Camp (R-Mich.), then Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, 
called for a five-year spend-down on donor-advised funds as part of his tax 
reform proposal. Both the Madoff and Camp proposals aimed at flushing 
the money held by donor-advised funds into the charitable community. 
Is a five- or seven-year spend-down requirement the perfect time peri-
od for donor-advised funds? Perhaps not – but a per-account spend-down 
requirement of some sort makes perfect sense. At this point more and more 
money is going into donor-advised funds, where it can sit indefinitely, and it 
is in the financial interest of donor-advised fund sponsors and of financial 
advisors (where they are involved) to encourage only a minimal distribu-
tion. This is at odds with the needs of the community and the intent of Con-
gress in creating the charitable deduction. 
A reasonable alternative would be to require the spend-down of donor-
advised fund assets within 15 or 20 years of the time the money is donated. 
Moreover, a rule could be put in place requiring each donor to name a non-
DAF charitable beneficiary (or set of beneficiaries) to receive any undis-
tributed funds at the end of the designated period. This structure would re-
tain the flexibility and attractiveness of donor-advised funds (the donor, af-
ter all, would still have 15 or 20 years to make the distributions), while en-
suring that the public’s needs are met through distribution of the assets 
within a reasonable period of time. This would eliminate the opportunity to 
use the DAF as a perpetual entity, which would undoubtedly make some 
donors unhappy. But if donors are insistent upon creating a perpetual, inter-
generational fund, they still have the option of creating a private foundation 
(albeit with less advantageous tax rules). 
I recognize that this proposal would require DAF sponsors to adjust 
their business model. Without a doubt there would be a scramble to come 
up with software for tracking the distribution of assets. Sponsors would also 
need guidance on how to account for capital appreciation within the funds. 
Finally, it’s likely that DAF sponsors would need to increase their fees, giv-
                                                                                                                           
 16 Ray D. Madoff, “Tax Write-off Now, Charity Later,” The New York Times, November 21, 
2011. 
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en that the pace of grantmaking would be more vigorous and that the funds 
would be invested for a shorter duration. All of this said, the inconvenience 
to the sponsors would be more than compensated by the increased charita-
ble impact of their grantmaking. We need to remind ourselves that the chari-
table deduction was not put in place to make life easier for a particular set 
of charitable institutions (in this case, the DAF sponsors), but to improve 
the condition of our nation. The quicker distribution of assets to charitable 
purposes would accomplish just that. 
One caveat: We need to differentiate between creating a required 
spend-down for donor-advised funds – that is, paying the assets out within a 
certain number of years – and instituting an annual distribution requirement, 
such as the five-percent annual distribution rate required of foundations. An 
annual distribution rate for donor-advised funds, unless set at a very high 
level, would do more harm than good. A five-percent annual spending re-
quirement for DAFs, which some have suggested, would cement in place 
the notion that donor-advised funds can and should be perpetual. It would 
also likely reduce the actual spending rate, which was what happened with 
foundations when the five-percent rule came into existence in 1969. (After 
1969, the minimum payout of five percent became the de facto maximum 
for most foundations, including some that had previously been making 
grants at a higher rate.) Moreover, requiring small annual distributions 
would limit the flexibility of donor-advised funds, particularly their ability 
to make occasional-but-significant grants to major projects. 
So to be clear, I am advocating a term-certain spend-down require-
ment. I am generally opposed to an annual distribution requirement. 
THE PRESSURE ON NONPROFITS 
The need to reform donor-advised funds is driven by the recognition 
that the nonprofit sector provides vital services to the country, that funds in 
the hands of nonprofits result in social good, and that nonprofits are under 
enormous financial and programmatic pressure. For the seventh year in a 
row, a majority of nonprofits reported an increased demand for services.17 
Government funding for nonprofits, which in recent decades has underwrit-
ten about one-third of their operating expenses, continues to be cut at the 
federal, state, and local levels. Corporate giving has shrunk dramatically as 
a percentage of pre-tax profits,18 and an increasing percentage of corporate 
giving is tied closely to the marketing of particular products, making fund-
ing inaccessible to many nonprofits. 
                                                                                                                           
 17 ,” Nonprofit Finance Fund, “2015 State of the Sector http://nonprofitfinancefund.org/state-
of-the-sector-surveys, accessed July 3, 2015. 
 18 Giving USA™ 2015 Report. 
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The largest single source of donations for nonprofits – 72 percent – is 
giving from living individuals.19 When there is a disruption in the flow of 
donations from individuals, as the evidence suggests is happening because 
of donor-advised funds, there are compelling reasons to undertake reform. 
The work of nonprofits is too important, and the pressures on the sector too 
intense, to look the other way. 
A SENSE OF PERSPECTIVE, AND A RESOLUTION TO WORK TOGETHER 
People in the philanthropic sector know about donor-advised funds, 
and many have strong feelings about how DAFs operate. Some are pushing 
for reform, while others are offering a full-throated defense of the status 
quo. Many have a personal stake in this debate, a connection that cannot 
help but influence their opinions. Given the emotions and vested interests 
involved in this question, perhaps it would be useful to draw back and con-
sider how donor-advised funds as currently operated appear to people with 
a more objective perspective. 
Imagine that you try to explain to the average person that dozens of 
Wall Street firms have created affiliated nonprofit donor-advised fund spon-
soring organizations. Describe how the money in those DAFs is generally 
invested in the commercial firms’ mutual funds, and that the donors’ finan-
cial advisors draw a management fee, making more money over time if the 
funds are relatively inactive. Explain that the money never needs to go to 
charity and, by federal law, can remain invested indefinitely. And point out 
that the donors received the same charitable deduction at the time they es-
tablished their funds as someone who had given directly to a homeless shel-
ter. 
I ask those who are adamantly defending the donor-advised fund status 
quo to consider how DAFs look from the outside. Yes, we can understand 
how donor-advised funds evolved over the last 80 years to arrive at the 
place where they are now. Certainly, we appreciate how donor-advised 
funds facilitate charitable giving, and we know many donors who are man-
aging their funds responsibly and with great commitment. But, particularly 
since the deep involvement of the financial services industry, donor-advised 
funds simply don’t look right, and that’s because they aren’t right. Donor-
advised funds as currently structured are not deserving of the same charita-
ble deduction as an operating public charity. 
Reform is coming. Rather than denying that inevitability, and rather 
than marginalizing and vilifying those proposing reform of the current rules, 
leaders in the donor-advised fund industry should acknowledge common 
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ground and join in developing DAF reforms that will accomplish three 
goals: maximizing distributions to charity, providing donors with an appro-
priate degree of flexibility, and closing loopholes that allow private founda-
tions to circumvent the five-percent distribution rule through grants to do-
nor-advised funds. When all is said and done, those suggesting reform of 
donor-advised funds are simply asserting that charitable impact should re-
main the central driver of philanthropy. This is hardly revolutionary, and it’s 
certainly not un-American. Reform of donor-advised funds is right, neces-
sary, and long overdue. 
